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Current U.S. Policy on the
Crime of Aggression: History in
the Unmaking?
Donald M. Ferencz*
At the 2015 Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, a U.S. policy statement on the crime of
aggression was presented as part of a panel entitled “The ICC
Crime of Aggression and the Changing International Security
Landscape.” This article examines current U.S. policy on the
crime of aggression, highlighting the historic role that the U.S.
played in establishing aggression as an international crime after
World War II, and concludes that activation of ICC jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression would be a significant step forward
in the development of international law.
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I remind you that 23 members of the United Nations have
bound themselves by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal to
the principle that planning, initiating or waging a war of
aggression is a crime against humanity for which individuals as
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well as states shall be tried before the bar of international
justice. 1
U.S. President Harry Truman, Addressing the U.N. General
Assembly, 23 October 1946.

I. Brief background on the crime of aggression
Sixty million dead2 and the introduction of weapons of such mindnumbing destructive capacity as to threaten all life on earth could not
help but leave those who had survived the carnage of World War II
determined to curb war-making itself.3 The year 1945 thus witnessed
not only the establishment of the United Nations, whose Charter
expressly prohibits the unauthorized use of force,4 but also the historic
opening of the ground-breaking Nuremberg Trials, whose judgment
indelibly and conspicuously branded aggressive war as “the supreme
international crime.”5

1.

President Harry Truman, Address in New York City at the Opening
Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 23, 1946)
(transcript available at
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=914
[https://perma.cc/9R39-B9SS]) (President Truman delivered this speech
the night before the first anniversary of entry into force of the United
Nations Charter).

2.

The 60 million total deaths, of which 45 million were civilian deaths,
does not include up to 20 million people who may have been killed in
China. WWII by the Numbers: World-Wide Deaths, NAT’L WWII
MUSEUM, available at
http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/forstudents/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/world-wide-deaths.html
[https://perma.cc/5NYE-FRDT].

3.

“We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has
brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . and to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained . . . And for these
Ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace . . . and to unite
our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure
. . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest . . .
Have Resolved to Combine our Efforts to Accomplish these Aims”
See U.N. Charter pmbl. (emphasis added).

4.

See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 41-42, 51 (proscribing the use of force unless
authorized by the Security Council or occurring in response to an armed
attack).

5.

22 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 427 (1948)
(The Nuremberg Trials included not only the quadripartite IMT held
pursuant to The London Agreement of August 8, 1945, but also the
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Students of history will know that the United States played a
critical role in seeing to it that those accused at Nuremberg would
stand trial for their crimes, rather than simply be taken out and shot–
–as was the initial preference of both Stalin and Churchill.6 Moreover,
American insistence was responsible for assuring that crimes against
peace was among the indictable offenses at Nuremberg––the first time
in history that aggressive war-making would be charged as a crime
and that those responsible for it would be held personally
accountable.7
The Nuremberg Charter, which set forth the provisions pursuant
to which the International Military Tribunal (IMT) would be
conducted, was annexed to the London Agreement signed on the
morning of August 8, 1945.8 It enumerated three crimes for which
individuals could be held accountable in their personal capacities,
regardless of their positions of national leadership. These included war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace––the core
feature of which was the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances.”9
twelve American-led “Subsequent Proceedings” held at Nuremberg
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945).
6.

See Dave Johns, Defining Justice, FRONTLINE WORLD (Jan. 24, 2006),
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/defining_index.html
[http://perma.cc/SZ2H-XQE7] (describing Saddam Hussein’s capture,
confinement awaiting trial, and history of imprisoning, rather than
killing, enemy leaders).

7.

See Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and Its Origins: The
Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2324, 2326 (2002) (discussing the role of the United States in
developing the inclusion of Crimes Against Peace in the Nuremberg
Charter).

8.

Coincidentally, the London Agreement was signed on the same day that
President Harry Truman put his signature to the United States
ratification of the U.N. Charter, making the United States the first
country to officially join the U.N. It is no small irony that before the
sun had set on Washington or on London that evening, an American B29 bomber had already taken off from the island of Tinian in the
Pacific, en route to dropping the atomic bomb that was to obliterate the
city of Nagasaki just a few hours later. See The London Agreement of
August 8th 1945 art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280;
John Q. Barrett, London Agreement (1945), JACKSON LIST (Aug. 8,
2015), http://thejacksonlist.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/20150808-Jackson-List-London-Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CCC-HQZ6] (describing the signing of the
agreement).

9.

Nuremberg Charter art. 6; Nuremberg Trials Final Report Appendix D:
Control Council Law No. 10 art. 2, ¶ 1(a) Dec. 20, 1945, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp [https://perma.cc/H7PQ9CNZ] (while the IMT’s definition of crimes against peace focused on
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At Nuremberg, Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British prosecutor,
articulated the proposition that those who conduct wars in violation
of international law are ineligible to claim, in defense, that such wars
were executed in accordance with the laws and customs of war:
The killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both in
international and in municipal law, only where the war itself is
legal. But where a war is illegal . . . there is nothing to justify
the killing, and these murders are not to be distinguished from
those of any other lawless robber bands.10

At the end of the ten-month trial, the IMT delivered its judgment
on September 30, 1946.11 Truman’s October address to the United
Nations, quoted above, came close on its heels, and was part of an
American-led initiative pushing for worldwide recognition of the legal
precedents established at Nuremberg. Before the year was out, the
General Assembly, acting at the behest of the United States,
unanimously approved Resolution 95(I), affirming the Nuremberg
principles and directing that work begin on codifying them within an
international criminal code.12
Immediately after the conclusion of the IMT, Justice Robert H.
Jackson, the American Chief of Counsel at Nuremberg, reported on
the import of the trial to President Truman. In his report he wrote
that “[n]o one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles
on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute

acts constituting illegal war, Control Council Law No. 10 went beyond
this definition, expressly specifying that the crime also applied to
invasions. Thus, Nuremberg’s subsequent proceedings—made up of a
dozen more criminal trials during December of 1945 overseen by the
United States, acting on its own authority—made an invasion, as
distinct from a war, prosecutable as an act included within crimes
against peace).
10.

19 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 458 (1948)
(emphasis added) (with my continuing thanks to Matthew Gillet and
Manuel Ventura for bringing this quotation to my attention).

11.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 5, at 427.

12.

Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal: General Assembly Resolution 95(I),
U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. (2008),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_95-I/ga_95-I_ph_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VSL2-BCH5] (explaining that upon the United
States’ demand, the U.N. General Assembly, on December 11, 1946,
unanimously affirmed the principles of the Nuremberg Charter and
judgment, and called for work to be undertaken regarding the
development of an International Criminal Code based on those
principles).
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law, and law with a sanction.”13 At the pace at which matters
appeared to be proceeding, his conclusion seemed, at the time, to be
an accurate assessment of where things were headed.
Notwithstanding such initial momentum toward universalizing
Nuremberg’s core crimes, further progress was stymied by the politics
of the Cold War.14 As a consequence, half a century would pass before
the seeds of such early efforts showed signs of the hoped-for harvest.15
The effort to bring to fruition a criminal code including
Nuremberg’s core crimes achieved a milestone of historic proportions
in 2002, with the entry into force of the Rome Statute (“the Rome
Statute” or “the Statute”) of the International Criminal Court (“the
Court” or “the ICC”).16 But, as far as the crime of aggression was
concerned, there was still plenty of work to do. Though the Statute
technically vested the Court with aggression jurisdiction, it provided
that such jurisdiction could not be exercised until later provisions
were adopted, defining the crime and specifying the conditions under
which the Court could prosecute it.17 Precisely when––and if––such
additional provisions might eventually be adopted was anyone’s guess,
but it would certainly not occur prior to a review conference, expected
to be held at least seven years after the coming into force of the Rome
Statute.18 Thus, notwithstanding that there was finally a permanent
international criminal court which had ostensibly been vested with
jurisdiction over aggression, the “supreme international crime” found
itself rather ignominiously relegated to a state of legal limbo.

13.

Letter from Justice Jackson to President Truman (Oct. 7, 1946)
(emphasis added), (on file at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack63.asp
[https://perma.cc/W9CP-95VN]).

14.

Giulio M. Gallarotti, Politics, International Justice, and the United
States: Toward a Permanent International Criminal Court, DIVISION II
FAC. PUBLICATIONS, Apr. 1999, at 3.

15.

See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
1996 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n Vol. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (explaining that the efforts of the
International Law Commission in this regard culminated in 1996 in the
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind).

16.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF
183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].

17.

Article 5.2 of the Rome Statute, prior to the amendments adopted at
the Kampala Review Conference, stated: “The Court shall exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” See id. at art.
5, ¶ 2.

18.

See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 123.
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At present, despite such continuing relegation, proponents of the
Court’s aggression jurisdiction have reasons for optimism. During the
ICC Review Conference, held in Kampala in 2010, amendments to the
Rome Statute were adopted by consensus, which, if activated, will
finally grant the Court active jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
possibly as early as 2017.19 According to the terms of such
amendments, they may be activated––subject to the collective reapproval of the Assembly of States Parties––once they have been
ratified by at least thirty States Parties, twenty-eight of which have
already done so.20
Notwithstanding such progress, it is a sad fact that those who
would commit the crime of aggression may still do so in the
knowledge that the Court is currently powerless to prosecute them for
it. But the days of such impunity may be numbered. As in the
feature-length film with a similar-sounding title, the Court’s
aggression jurisdiction stands tantalizingly close to activation as “the
fourth element” of the Rome Statute21––a weapon of mass instruction
in the arsenal of international law––signalling that aggressors may
soon be held accountable for their crimes, just as Justice Jackson had
predicted.
19.

The adopted amendments define the crime and provide the conditions
under which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. However, as part of
an overall compromise package, it was agreed in Kampala that the
Court would not be able to exercise its aggression jurisdiction until and
unless thirty States Parties to the Rome Statute ratified the Kampala
amendments and the Assembly of States Parties reapproved them,
which approval could not occur until after January 1, 2017. It should be
noted, however, that the definition of the crime of aggression, covering a
litany of aggressive acts, was adopted outright, and is, therefore, neither
subject to the peculiar additional thirty-ratifications rule nor reapproval by the Assembly of States Parties. INT’L CRIM. CRT., Review
Conference of the Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court,
Kampala, 31 May – 11 June 2010 Official Records (2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC-11-ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FX9B-29R7].

20.

See Ratification Status: Amendments on the crime of aggression to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, EQUIPO NIZKOR
(Mar. 4, 2016), available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/aggression/doc/status.html
[https://perma.cc/LU3K-AXG6] (showing that, as of March 7, 2016, the
countries that had ratified the Kampala amendments on aggression
included Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia,
Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland,
Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay).

21.

Anyone who has seen the “The Fifth Element” (a 1997 film starring
Bruce Willis, Gary Oldman, and Milla Jovovich) will know what I’m
talking about.
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But not everyone agrees that activating the Court’s independent
aggression jurisdiction is a good idea.22 The permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council believe the Court’s aggression jurisdiction
should not be exercisable without pre-clearance from the Council
itself. Although only two of the permanent members of the Council
(“P-5”) are Parties to the Rome Statute,23 their collective influence is
significant.
Moreover, although the compromise reached in Kampala allows
states, in certain circumstances, to opt out of the Court’s aggression
jurisdiction,24 the optics of such an opt-out may be problematic. After
all, is it likely that a state involved in a legally questionable military
action would risk the potential opprobrium associated with electing to
opt out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction if it did not seriously
believe that there was reasonable doubt as to the legality of its
actions? And are such doubts something that any national leader
would like to publicly admit? Beyond this, if such an opt-out
occurred, is it possible that the “opt-out” state’s coalition partners
might also feel tainted by such an opting out? Whether considerations
such as these have had an influence or not, it is clear that not all who
joined in negotiating the terms of Kampala’s compromise package are
comfortable with how its provisions may combine to play out in
practice.25
22.

For purposes of this essay, “independent” aggression jurisdiction refers
to aggression jurisdiction which is either on a proprio motu or state
referral basis, but not a situation referred by the Security Council.

23.

Thus far, only the United Kingdom and France have ratified the Rome
Statute, thus becoming members of the ICC’s Assembly of States
Parties.

24.

See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at arts. 15 bis, 15 ter (showing how
this rule applies to the Court’s aggression jurisdiction based on state
referrals or proprio motu investigations brought at the behest of the
Prosecutor of the ICC, but not to referrals by the U.N. Security
Council).

25.

For a discussion of some of the concerns regarding uncertainties related
to how the Kampala amendments may be interpreted, and urging the
resolution of such uncertainties prior to 2017, see Harold Hongju Koh &
Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States
Perspective, 109 AJIL 257, 257-85 (April 2015). In response to Koh and
Buchwald see, e.g., Bing Bing Jia, The Crime of Aggression as Custom
and the Mechanisms for Determining Acts of Aggression, 109 AJIL 569,
569-82 (July 2015); Alain Pellet, Response to Koh and Buchwald’s
Article: Don Quixote and Sancho Panza Tilt at Windmills, 109 AJIL
557, 557-69 (July 2015). For an online discussions of this topic, see also
Dapo Akande, AJIL Unbound Symposium on the Crime of Aggression,
EJIL: Talk! (Mar. 3, 2106), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/ajilunbound-symposium-on-the-crime-of-aggression/
[https://perma.cc/X58H-AV23]; John Bellinger, USG Concerns with the
ICC Aggression Amendment, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 5, 2016, 7:09 AM),
available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/usg-concerns-icc-aggression-
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Finally, it should be recalled that at Nuremberg crimes against
peace covered wars of aggression, or wars in violation of international
treaties, agreements, or assurances. The definition of the crime of
aggression set forth within the Kampala amendments goes well
beyond this. In addition to criminalizing acts that would amount to
crimes against peace at Nuremberg, it criminalizes a litany of acts
which were characterized in a 1974 General Assembly resolution as
prima facie acts of aggression,26 but only if they rise to the level of
manifest violations of the UN Charter as to their combined character,
gravity, and scale.27

II. Current U.S. Policy on the ICC Crime of
Aggression
It is against this backdrop that at the 2015 annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law, Sarah Sewall, the U.S. State
Department’s Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and
Human Rights delivered what has been described as “a major policy
speech on the crime of aggression.”28 The address presented three serious
U.S. concerns with amendments to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court which, if made effective, will, at long last, operationalize
Truman’s vision of a bar of international justice before which aggressors may be
tried for their crimes.29
amendments [https://perma.cc/L8B7-Q979]; David Bosco, Who’s Afraid
of Aggression Prosecutions?, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 8, 2016, 1:15 PM),
available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/whos-afraid-aggressionprosecutions [https://perma.cc/AQ4W-7EE6]. For a recent live debate
regarding the crime of aggression, see Videotape: The International
Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression, on the website of the
German Center for Research and Innovation, which hosted a discussion
between Harold Koh and Professor Claus Kress (Feb. 22, 2016),
available at http://www.germaninnovation.org/news-andevents/videos?video=733f9287-f0df-e511-83dd-00155dcfd969&page=1
[https://perma.cc/M56X-F456].
26.

G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, arts. 2-4 (Dec. 14,
1974).

27.

See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 8 bis (defining “crimes of
aggression,” as adopted in Kampala).

28.

See Beth Van Schaack, U.S. Policy on the ICC Crime of Aggression
Announced, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 21, 2015, 8:03 AM), available at
http://justsecurity.org/22248/u-s-policy-icc-crime-aggression/
[https://perma.cc/4K2Y-W8S8].

29.

See INT’L CRIM. CRT., supra note 19, at 17-22 (discussing the text of the
compromise solution to activation of the Court’s jurisdiction that was
agreed to at Kampala); Stefan Barriga & Leena Grover, A Historic
Breakthrough on the Crime of Aggression, 105 AM. J. INT’L LAW 517,
533 (2011) (explaining that “[u]ltimately, the political will in Kampala
to end impunity for the crime of aggression united delegations and
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As discussed below, the U.S. is concerned that activation of the Court’s
aggression jurisdiction pursuant to the terms of the amendments and
the negotiated list of understandings adopted in Kampala will:
1) Have a chilling effect on potential coalition partners in U.S.led military actions which, though lacking legal authorization by
the U.N. Security Council, may nonetheless be undertaken with
legitimate humanitarian interests or objectives in mind,
2) Make it more difficult to grant amnesty to leaders who are
alleged to have committed the crime of aggression, thereby
potentially impeding peace deals which would grant immunity
for such offenses; and
3) Impede the Court’s core mission of prosecuting for atrocity
crimes by embroiling it in politically charged controversies,
which it is unsuited to deal with.30

Under-Secretary Sewall argued that such U.S. concerns “have
been exacerbated by the efforts of some supporters of the amendments
to promote an interpretation – which we believe flies clearly in the
face of the plain language of the Rome Statute – contending that the
Court’s aggression jurisdiction would extend even to the nationals of
states parties that do not ratify the amendments.”31 This accusation,
while not entirely clear, appears to refer to the fact that the terms
enabled them to overlook any imperfections in the final outcome”); see
generally Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala
Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179
(2010) (overviewing the compromises at the Kampala Conference);
Jutta Bertram Nothnagel, A Seed for World Peace Planted in Africa:
The Provisions on the Crime of Aggression Adopted at the Kampala
Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, AFR. LEGAL AID Q., available at
http://www.africalegalaid.com/news/the-provisions-on-the-crime-ofaggression-kampala-conference [https://perma.cc/85VA-3YCH] (stating
that “[e]xactly because the crime is committed by leaders who ‘control
or direct’ the machinery of the State, requiring State acceptance for
their prosecution would seem to be highly counterproductive, especially
if such acceptance can be rather easily withheld or withdrawn”); see
S.C. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010); Sarah Sewall, Under Sec’y Civilian Sec.,
Democracy, & Hum. Rts., U.S. Dep’t State, Speech at the American
Society of Law Annual Meeting: The ICC Crime of Aggression and the
Changing International Security Landscape (Apr. 9, 2015) (transcript
available at http://www.state.gov/j/remarks/240579.htm
[https://perma.cc/PX5U-WGLX]) [hereinafter Sewall Speech] (her
remarks may also be viewed online, including comments from the floor,
at https://www.asil.org/resources/2015-annual-meeting
[https://perma.cc/8ZNZ-DK6D]).
30.

Van Shaack, supra note 28.

31.

Sewall Speech, supra note 29.
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agreed to in Kampala could allow the Court––in limited
circumstances––to exercise its independent aggression jurisdiction over
nationals of States Parties which have not yet ratified the Kampala
amendments.32

III. Observations Regarding the Stated U.S. Concerns
A. Possible Chilling Effect on Military Coalition Partners

First among the enumerated U.S. concerns is that activating the
Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, as it is currently
defined within the Rome Statute, “could chill the willingness of states
to cooperate in certain military action where the legal basis for that
action might be contested.”33 Such a concern is certainly
understandable in the context of any military action which has
neither been authorized by the U.N. Security Council nor undertaken
in self-defense after an armed attack––as would generally be permitted
under the U.N. Charter.34 It must be kept in mind that before any
such action could be successfully prosecuted as an act of aggression
under the Rome Statute, it would need to constitute a manifest
violation of the U.N. Charter as to its combined character, gravity,
and scale.35 Although the precise manner in which the Court will
interpret the contours of such a threshold clause cannot be predicted
with absolute certainty, it may reasonably be inferred that in order
32.

The compromise crafted and agreed to in Kampala allows for the
assertion of jurisdiction over nationals of all states if the Security
Council refers an aggression case. Short of a referral by the Security
Council, the Court cannot assert jurisdiction over nationals of nonStates Parties, nor may it do so over nationals of States Parties which
have opted out of the Court’s independent aggression jurisdiction. To
avoid application of the Court’s independent aggression jurisdiction, a
State Party need do nothing more than file a declaration to the effect
that it elects to opt out of such jurisdiction. Such a jurisdictional regime
brings into play the meaning of Article 121(5) of the Statute, discussed
in further detail below – that is, whether a State Party may be required
to opt out of the application of an amendment that it has not previously
ratified. See infra Part III.D. As discussed below, the whole debate over
Article 121(5) may be seen essentially as a “red herring,” since no State
Party’s leaders need be subjected to the Court’s independent aggression
jurisdiction should their State decide to opt out of such jurisdiction. See
infra Part III.D

33.

See Sewall Speech, supra note 29.

34.

See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 42, 51 (proscribing the use of force unless
authorized by the Security Council or occurring in response to an armed
attack); see generally C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ARMAGEDDON OR BRAVE
NEW WORLD? REFLECTIONS ON THE HOSTILITIES IN IRAQ (1st ed. 2003)
(providing an interesting discussion on the parameters of legality
covering the use of armed force).

35.

See S.C. RC/Res. 6, supra note 29, at art. 8 bis(1).
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for an act of aggression to warrant prosecution before the Court, it
would need to constitute a fairly serious violation of the U.N. Charter
as to some combination of its purpose, methods of execution, scope,
and effects. This is a fairly clear indication that a bona fide
humanitarian intervention is beyond the scope of what is covered by
the Rome Statute’s definition of the crime of aggression––as it should
be, akin to the manner in which the “necessity defense” is recognized
in certain domestic criminal proceedings.36
But there is some very good news here as far as possible “chilling
effects” on potential U.S. coalition partners are concerned. Pursuant
to the terms of the Kampala amendments, short of a referral by the
Security Council, the Court can neither exercise its aggression
jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties nor over an act of
aggression committed by any State Party that elects to opt out of the
Court’s aggression jurisdiction.37 Thus, should a State Party wish to
insulate its nationals from possible prosecution with respect to a
States Party or proprio motu situation referral, it need do nothing
more than file a piece of paper with the Court, declaring that it will
not be bound by the Court’s jurisdiction as to any acts of aggression
which it may commit.38 The general effect of such an opt-out is not in
dispute.
Having said that, there are rather obvious reasons why no state
would wish to be in a position of having to publicly opt out of the
Court’s aggression jurisdiction. After all, wouldn’t such an opt-out
run the risk of appearing to represent a concern––possibly even
construed by some as an outright concession––that the state in
question believes that its actions could potentially constitute the
crime of aggression? And if such action was part of a broader military
coalition, might such an opt-out have the undesirable consequence of
bringing into question the legality of the entire military undertaking,
thereby potentially giving rise to the spectre of culpability of each of
the national leaders who bear responsibility for either initiating it or
participating in it?

36.

See Jennifer Trahan, Defining the ‘Grey Area’ Where Humanitarian
Intervention May not be Fully Legal, but is not the Crime of Aggression,
2 J. USE FORCE & INT’L LAW, 42 (2015) (discussing the relationship
between the crime of aggression and humanitarian intervention when
the interveners are also the aggressors); R. v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16
(appeal taken from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (U.K.)),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329
/jones.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWN9-5PS4] (discussing the crime of
aggression in international customary law and its defenses).

37.

See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 15 bis, ¶ 4 (describing the
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression).

38.

See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 15 bis, ¶ 4.
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B. Impairment of Ability to Resolve Ongoing Conflicts

The second of the U.S. concerns is that activating the Court’s jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression “may reduce the ability of the international
community to manage and resolve conflicts”39––meaning that it could
be more difficult to broker peace deals if amnesty is sought by those who
commit the crime of aggression. With respect to this issue, it must, once again,
be kept in mind that, short of a referral by the U.N. Security Council, the Court
lacks jurisdiction over acts of aggression committed by nationals of non-States
Parties and, similarly, lacks jurisdiction over acts of aggression committed by
States Parties which have opted-out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction. In
essence, the option to opt-out, itself, offers an easy route to potential
amnesty.
It may be surmised that those who would be most likely to find
themselves the subject of prosecution for the crime of aggression in
the case of a state party or proprio motu referral would be in such a
position because their own country elected not to opt-out of the
Court’s jurisdiction. In such case, one might well conclude that their
own societies view them as deserving of prosecution, rather than
amnesties. At the same time, when the Security Council refers an
aggression case, presumably there would be a rather strong
international consensus that such a case should go forward.
In reflecting on whether those in positions of power should be
granted immunity for serious acts of aggression, it is hard not to be
reminded of the words of Justice Jackson at Nuremberg:
The common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop
with the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must
also reach men who possess themselves of great power and make
deliberate and concerted use of it to set in motion evils which
leave no home in the world untouched.40

As highlighted in Under-Secretary Sewall’s address, the
international community is opposed to amnesties for atrocity crimes.41
To suggest immunity for those who propagate the illegal uses of force,
which invariably result in the very atrocity crimes that the
international community condemns, seems a far cry from the historic
precedents established at Nuremberg. To deter the Court from
39.

Sewall Speech, supra note 29.

40.

2 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 98-155
(1947) (emphasis added).

41.

See Sewall Speech, supra note 29 (stating, “[w]hile the international
community has strived for consensus around the principle that atrocities
cannot legitimately be the subject of an amnesty, it is not obvious that
the same approach is appropriate for the crime of aggression, which is of
a fundamentally different character”).
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enforcing the law, rather than deterring those who would break it,
may be seen by some as expedient in the short term, but such an
approach does nothing to advance respect for the predictable and
uniform rule of law––a principle generally enshrined within U.S. legal
traditions.42
C. Interference with the ICC’s Core Mission of Prosecuting and Helping
to Deter Atrocity Crimes

The last of the three U.S. concerns is that activation of the Court’s
aggression jurisdiction “will impair the Court’s ability to carry out its
core mission––deterring and punishing genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.”43 The basis for this concern is that
“assessments involved in prosecuting aggression will inevitably be
deeply political,”44 burdening the “already struggling”45 Court with “a
role better suited for political actors.”46 Presumably, such remarks are
in contemplation of a case which has not been referred by the
Security Council, since any referral by the Council would likely
already reflect a broad consensus––political or otherwise––regarding
potential prosecution for the crime of aggression.
As to cases growing out of a state referral or the Prosecutor’s
proprio motu investigation power, the opt-out alternative clearly
limits the prospect of prosecuting nationals without the assent of their
own State of nationality. This, combined with the fact that
jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties is altogether
excluded, substantially limits the likelihood that any particular state’s
point of view will exert undue influence because the assent of the
state of the accused is, essentially, a prerequisite to prosecution.
There is no question, however, that adjudication of cases relating
to the crime of aggression will involve difficult and complex issues––
not the least of which may be the deep reluctance of states to disclose
their sources of information and the details of intelligence-gathering
networks and technologies. Divulging such details could, naturally,
have significant political consequences for the states involved. But,
42.

The words “Equal justice under law” are etched in the portico of the
United States Supreme Court. If they stand for anything, they certainly
stand for predictable enforcement of law, rather than amnesty for those
who break it. See generally Off. Curator, The West Pediment:
Information Sheet,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/westpediment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KB3-7RHT] (providing an overview, photos, and the
history of the West Pediment of the Supreme Court Building).

43.

Sewall Speech, supra note 29.

44.

Sewall Speech, supra note 29.

45.

Sewall Speech, supra note 29.

46.

Sewall Speech, supra note 29.
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the carte blanche assertion that aggression cases would necessarily
and “inevitably be so deeply political” as to undermine the Court
itself may well be viewed by skeptics as tantamount to an application
of all-purpose gravy intended to mask the perhaps not-so-palatable
cafeteria-style meatloaf simmering beneath its surface.
The contention that the crime of aggression is, ipso facto, a
“highly politicized crime” was voiced by State Department personnel
well before the consent-based approach was developed and agreed in
Kampala.47 Given the features of the consent-based regime adopted at
the Review Conference––applicable to all but Security Council
referred cases––the politicized prosecutions argument seems to have
significantly diminished currency compared to what may have been
the case had the regime adopted in Kampala been less flexible.
Beyond this, the Court lacks its own enforcement mechanisms
and is, therefore, highly reliant on the goodwill of cooperating states
to offer the access and assistance necessary for successful
investigations and prosecutions. Consequently, unless there is
cooperation on the part of the state whose nationals may be the
subject of prosecution for the crime of aggression, such prosecution
could be so hampered as to be beyond successful prosecution by the
Court. It may, therefore, be prudent of the Court to heed the
concerns voiced by the U.S. in such circumstances, and avoid
dissipating its resources and reputation on such cases.
D. Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-ratifying States Parties: The
Article 121(5) Issue

The concern that the jurisdictional regime agreed to in Kampala
potentially allows the Court to exercise its aggression jurisdiction over
nationals of States Parties, regardless of whether or not their State
has ratified the Kampala amendments raises an apparent conflict with
the language of Article 121(5) of the Statute.48
47.

Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The
Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010)
(transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm
[https://perma.cc/R4JG-UCUN]).

48.

It should be kept in mind that the compromise crafted and agreed to in
Kampala allows for the assertion of jurisdiction over nationals of all
states if the Security Council refers an aggression case. Short of a
referral by the Security Council, the Court cannot assert jurisdiction
over any nationals of non-States Parties, and may only assert
jurisdiction over nationals of States Parties which have failed to
affirmatively opt out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction – but only
where such nationals are accused of committing the crime of aggression
against a State Party which, itself, has ratified the Kampala
amendments. To avoid having its nationals potentially subject to the
Court’s jurisdiction in such a case, a State Party need simply file a piece
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The key element of the argument for any State Party wishing not
to have the Court’s aggression jurisdiction applied to its nationals is
that, on its face, Article 121(5) of the Statute would seem to allow a
State Party to avoid the application of such jurisdiction by simply not
ratifying the amendments. In such case, an argument raised with
respect to the Kampala amendments is that States Parties cannot be
required to affirmatively opt out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction
unless they have already ratified the amendments, since if they fail to
ratify, such jurisdiction wouldn’t apply to their nationals in the first
place.
Although the issue, as more fully discussed immediately below,
may appear to be an arcane and even confusing topic, at the end of
the day, the basic question is really fairly simple: Will the countries
which adopted the Kampala amendments in a resolution which
claimed that they were “[r]esolved to activate the Court’s jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression as early as possible” make good on that
promise or not? Will powerful states agree to be bound by the law
criminalizing acts of aggression - or is such law only for those who
must rely on the force of law, rather than the law of force, to make
their way through the landscape of global affairs?
At the outset of the discussion regarding Article 121(5) it should
be kept in mind that the Article 121(5) issue is of greatest concern to
non-ratifying States Parties who wish to limit the risk of scrutiny by
the ICC with respect to their prospective commission of acts involving
the use of force not authorized by the U.N. Charter. Once a State
Party ratifies the Kampala amendments, the issue of how Article
121(5) ought best be interpreted becomes completely moot as to that
State Party.
It should be noted that even if the State Party in question has
ratified, they may still opt out of the Court’s independent aggression
jurisdiction if they wish to.49 Thus, the apparent real crux of the
concern is not really about being forced to accept the ICC’s
independent jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but rather how
a state will look in front of the eyes of the world if it opts out of such
jurisdiction in an effort to insulate its leaders from possible judicial
scrutiny for the crime of aggression. In this regard, any “group optouts” may be seen as little more than an attempt at camouflage.
of paper, declaring that it elects to opt out of the Court’s aggression
jurisdiction.
49.

Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 15 bis(4) (“The Court may, in
accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of
aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State
Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not
accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The
withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall
be considered by the State Party within three years.”).
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Insofar as the opt-out provisions agreed to in Kampala are
concerned, Article 121(5) has no application whatsoever to any case
where the Security Council has referred a situation involving an
aggression charge, since in such case, neither States Parties nor nonStates Parties have any right to opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction.
Similarly, as to States Parties which have demonstrated their
commitment to activating the Court’s aggression jurisdiction through
their own ratification of the Kampala amendments, any argument as
to tension between the express language of the Kampala amendments
and the express language of Article 121(5) is completely moot.
Non-ratifying States Parties wishing to avoid the application of
the Kampala amendments to their own nationals may well point to
the language of Article 121(5) for support. Yet whether Article 121(5)
may be seen to shield them from potentially having to affirmatively
opt out of aggression amendments which they have not yet ratified, is
a question which does not exist in isolation: it must be considered
within the context of the broader Rome Statute itself.
Let’s begin by looking at Article 121(5). It provides:
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall
enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the
amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has
not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when
committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.50

Although on its face, Article 121(5) would seem to expressly
exempt nationals of non-ratifying States Parties from the application
of any amendments to article 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Statute, such
language is either directly at odds with other provisions of the Statute
or incongruous in their light. For example, pursuant to Article 12(2)
of the Statute, the Court may assert jurisdiction even over nationals
of states which have altogether failed to ratify the Rome Statute if
their nationals commit genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity on the territory of a State Party. This means that
notwithstanding the fact that the Rome Statute has not “entered into
force” at all as far as the states of the perpetrators of such crimes are
concerned, the perpetrators may still come within the jurisdiction of
the Court. The issue of “coming into force” and ICC jurisdiction are
thus, two quite distinct things.
In a moment the contrast between the exceptions to jurisdiction
referenced in Article 124 versus Article 121(5) will be explored.
However, before doing that, let’s reflect for a moment on whether,
when drafted, Article 121(5)’s second sentence could possibly ever
50.

Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 121(5).
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have meant, in isolation, what it seems to say. Here is the point: from
inception, it has clearly been understood that, even as to non-ratifying
states, the ICC may assert jurisdiction where a crime over which the
ICC is able to exercise jurisdiction is committed on the territory of a
State Party. (Let’s put aside, for purposes of this discussion, the fact
that in Kampala it was agreed, strictly as a matter of compromise, to
completely exclude all nationals of non-States Parties from the ICC’s
state referral and proprio motu aggression jurisdiction).
If Article 121(5) is read to literally mean what it says, without
considering (as Article 124 does) the territorial jurisdictional rule
found within Article 12, what do we have? We have a provision which
seems to say that States Parties which do not ratify subsequent
amendments to the core crimes of the ICC would have an absolute
carte blanche “get out of jail free” card to play with respect to crimes
which, if they were committed by non-States Parties on the territory
of accepting States Parties would be fully subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Could this possibly have been the intention of the
drafters of Article 121(5)? Did they really mean to suggest that,
although the Court’s jurisdiction over amendments to the ICC’s core
crimes could clearly apply to nationals of non-States Parties, Article
121(5) would fully exempt nationals of States Parties in all cases––
even including Security Council referrals, and regardless of where the
crimes were committed? Was the message intended to be that there
are fully two groups of countries in the world––those which have
ratified no portion of the Rome Statute, yet whose nationals may still
be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed by them
on the territory of Member States and those which, by ratifying the
Rome Statute of the ICC, can potentially completely avoid any such
ICC jurisdiction as applied to amended core crimes––even if the
referral comes from the Security Council itself? Could this really be
what was intended?
When we analyze Article 124, below, and then compare its carveout of jurisdiction to the language of Article 121(5), the comparison
makes a literal reading of Article 121(5) seem even more untenable.
By contrast with Article 121(5), the abrogation of jurisdiction rule
found in Article 124 (relating to opting out of war crimes provisions
for a 7 year period)––expressly limits itself to the Court’s state referral
and proprio motu jurisdiction.51 It could not be clearer that Article
51.

Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art 124 (providing, in pertinent part:
“Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a
party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after
the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of
crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been
committed by its nationals or on its territory.”); Rome Statute, supra
note 16, at art. 12 (stating, in pertinent part:
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124 expressly provides that the rules of Article 12(1) and (2) do not
trump the jurisdictional carve-out for war crimes. Because Article 12
does not cover the grant of ICC jurisdiction based on Security Council
referrals (which is set forth in Article 13(c)), this means that the
carve-out of the Court’s jurisdiction allowed under Article 124 is
limited to the type of jurisdiction which may be conferred under
Article 12––and does not cover any carve-out of jurisdiction in cases
where the Security Council refers a case. Hence, the exception to
jurisdiction enunciated in Article 124 is qualitatively narrower and
more explicit than that articulated in Article 121(5).
The distinct difference between the texts of Articles 121(5) and
124 raises the obvious question: If Article 121(5) meant to completely
override the general jurisdictional rules imbedded within Article 12
(including its territorial jurisdiction implications) why did it not say
so in the very same way that such exception was expressly and
unambiguously articulated in Article 124? Why doesn’t Article
121(5), like Article 124, begin with language that says
“Notwithstanding Article 12 paragraphs 1 and 2”?
By contrast, Article 121(5) contains no limitation at all on its
exception from the Court’s jurisdiction. Upon a literal reading, taken
in isolation, this would seem to imply that the carve-out of
jurisdiction under the second sentence of Article 121(5) is absolute.
Presumptively, therefore, if we look only to the literal language of
Article 121(5) (as opposed, for example, to the jurisdictional carve-out
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article
5.
2.In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance
with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft,
the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.”);
Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 13 (“The Court may exercise its
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance
with the provisions of this Statute if:
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in
accordance with article 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a
crime in accordance with article 15.”).
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language found within Art. 124) ––not even a referral by the Council
would be sufficient to vest the Court with jurisdiction over the
national of a State Party which has failed to ratify an amendment to
the core crimes provisions, regardless of where the crime is alleged to
have been committed. Once again, the question arises: Can such an
overly broad interpretation of Article 121(5) possibly be construed as
reasonable in light of the entirety of the Rome Statute?
But any confusion caused by the seeming conflicts within the
Rome Statute is neither the fault nor the work of the Kampala
Review Conference. Beyond this, one might well argue that the
provisions of the Kampala compromise are controlling as to the
aggression amendments if for no other reason than the Rome Statute,
with quite specific and unique reference to the crime of aggression
itself, expressly authorized the Assembly of States Parties to adopt a
provision “defining the crime and setting out the conditions under
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this
crime.”52 And that is precisely what the Review Conference did in
Kampala. It would appear more than a bit inconsistent to argue that
Article 121(5) is a lex specialis rule that should be construed to
expressly supersede the provisions of Article 12 without conceding
that the language of Article 124 provides language that is much more
precise in doing so.
As to arguments regarding the potential lex specialis implications
of Article 121(5)53, it should be noted that––as to the question of
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression––you can hardly get more lex
specialis than the very specific and explicit authorization contained in
Article 5.2. It quite directly references the Assembly of States Parties’
authority with respect to the adoption of a provision “defining the
crime [of aggression] and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”54 The
language of Article 5.2 specifying that the adoption of such a
provision be in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 arguably goes
much more to the question of amendment procedure and issues
related to entry into force, rather than to issues pertaining to
jurisdiction––especially in light of the fact that it is clear, according to
the language of Article 5.2, that it will be the adopted provision,
itself, which will specify “the conditions under which the Court shall
exercise jurisdiction”55 with respect to the crime of aggression.

52.

Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2).

53.

The lex specialis argument is that Article 121(5) is so specific that it
effectively “trumps” the more general jurisdictional rules set forth
elsewhere within the Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 16.

54.

Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2) (emphasis added).

55.

Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2).
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Moreover, one cannot ignore the fact that a literal reading of
Article 121(5) would seem to allow that section’s carve-out of
jurisdiction to exempt the nationals of States Parties even where the
Security Council has referred an aggression case. This factor, alone,
would seem sufficient to demonstrate that Article 121(5) cannot
possibly be conclusively interpreted without considering other relevant
provisions within the Statute.
Any suggestion that the Kampala amendments are being
inappropriately interpreted with respect to the conclusion that their
opt-out provisions apply to both ratifying as well as non-ratifying
States Parties raises a number of questions. For example, if, in
Kampala, the consensus was that the opt-out mechanism only applies
to ratifying States Parties, why wasn’t such a limitation spelled out
within the language of the amendments themselves or agreed to and
included in the understandings which accompanied them? Moreover,
if mere non-ratification was seen in Kampala as sufficient to
completely exempt nationals of States Parties even if they commit the
crime of aggression on the territory of ratifying States Parties, why all
the fuss in Kampala in crafting the compromise opt-out mechanism in
the first place? Thus, rather than being crticized as flying in the face
of the Rome Statute, the conclusion that the opt-out regime applies
to all States Parties should perhaps more charitably be viewed as a
matter of faithful adherence to the quite specific jurisdictional
provisions adopted by consensus in Kampala.
Finally, notwithstanding the mental gymnastics that may
accompany a discussion of how Article 121(5) should properly be
construed, the question of whether a State Party wishing to avoid the
Court’s Article 15 bis aggression jurisdiction may need to opt out
even if it has not ratified the aggression amendments is more about
appearances than about substance. The real question is whether the
promise made in Kampala “to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression as early as possible” will be kept by those who
made it.

IV. U.S. Suggestions for Mitigation of its Concerns
In light of the expressed U.S. concerns with the Kampala
amendments, Under-Secretary Sewall suggested a series of possible
steps to mitigate the concerns:
xGovernments and parliaments of states parties could formally
state their views on the questions raised here. They can clarify
the scope of which acts are covered and confirm that the
amendments do not apply to states parties that do not ratify
the amendments. They could do this, for example, in statements
at upcoming sessions of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties, or
in written instruments communicating their decision whether or
not to ratify.
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xPerhaps most critically, if there were eventually a decision by
the Assembly of States Parties to activate the amendments,
states could insist that that decision contain clear guidance on
these issues.
xStates parties could clarify how the “opt-out” provisions
contained in the amendments might be used to help address the
concerns raised here and serve as a guardrail or check on an
overly broad application of the amendments.
xStates parties could also consider other steps, including the
possibility of adopting further understandings to ensure these
amendments do not work at cross-purposes to the critical goal
of preventing atrocity crimes.56

V. Further Reflections and Concluding Thoughts
The proposed mitigation steps set forth above are generally
tailored to address concerns regarding clarity, both as to definition
and jurisdictional reach. They are also arguably aimed at
circumscribing the scope of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction.
Regardless of the practicability of such proposed mitigation steps, the
U.S.––though not a party to the Rome Statute––still has considerable
influence, and it would, therefore, be surprising if the U.S. concerns
were simply ignored. Yet the United States is conspicuous in leading the
world in military spending as well as export of arms,57 at least some of which
may be suspected of having contributed to the commission of some of the very
atrocity crimes to which the ICC and the U.S. stand in opposition.58 The extent
56.

Sewall Speech, supra note 29.

57.

See Skye Gould & Jeremy Bender, These Charts Show the Immensity of
the US’ Defense Budget, BUS. INSIDER UK (Aug. 31, 2015, 3:25 PM),
http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-us-defense-budget-is-massive-20158?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/JN54-7EHP] (“In 2015, the US’
estimated military budget is expected to be $601 billion, down from
$610 billion spent in 2014. However, even with the budgetary
drawdown, the US still far outspends the next six highest spending
nations.”); Thom Shanker, U.S. Arms Sales Make Up Most of Global
Market, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/world/middleeast/us-foreignarms-sales-reach-66-3-billion-in-2011.html?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/37LF-24RT] (“Overseas weapons sales by the United
States totalled $66.3 billion last year, or more than three-quarters of the
global arms market, valued at $85.3 billion in 2011. Russia was a distant
second, with $4.8 billion in deals”).

58.

That the current U.S. administration is indeed committed to helping
prevent atrocity crimes is beyond question, and such commitment is
clearly evidenced by the ongoing work of the Atrocity Prevention Board,
established by the Obama Administration in 2012. Yet, in what may be
viewed by some as an anomalous contrast, in the recent federal court
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to which global perceptions with respect to such factors may have a bearing on
reactions to U.S. overtures regarding clarifying or limiting the Court’s aggression
jurisdiction is an open question.
The suggestion that confirmation should be forthcoming from the
ICC community to the effect that nationals of State Parties which
have neither ratified nor opted out of the Kampala amendments
should be immune from the Court’s independent aggression
jurisdiction may very well meet significant resistance. This is so
because the bundle of provisions that was adopted by consensus in
Kampala represented what could perhaps best be characterized as a
fully integrated compromise package. In describing the nature of the
deal struck there, Harold Koh, at the time Legal Advisor to the U.S.
Department of State––and a key negotiator of the package agreed to
at the Kampala Review Conference––put it this way: “Every single
piece of it was a critical part of what was decided.”59 He was, of
course, correct and there can be no getting away from his conclusions
in this regard.
It is impossible not to acknowledge that support for every aspect
of what was agreed to in Kampala may be a bit difficult to trace back
to specific language contained in the Rome Statute.60 For example,
the requirements that, before the Court may assert its aggression
jurisdiction over anyone, the Kampala amendments must not only be
ratified by thirty States Parties, but re-approved by the Assembly of
States Parties after January 1, 2017, are certainly not expressly found
case of Sundus Shaker Saleh, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al. (involving
an Iraqi citizen displaced by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003),
counsel for the United States have argued, among other things that:
The plain language of the Westfall Act clearly immunizes any
government official who acts within the scope of employment. It is
irrelevant whether plaintiff has successfully alleged a violation of such
international law norms. The Westfall Act grants absolute immunity to
federal employees for “wrongful” acts taken within the scope of
employment, whether or not they are illegal.
See Brief for Appellee at 20, Saleh, et al., v. Bush, et al., 2015 WL
4937588 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-15098). The government brief in
question goes on to point out that, for purposes of immunizing
government officials under the Westfall Act, it is irrelevant whether
they have committed “scope of employment” acts such as torture, rape,
or “egregious torts that violate jus cogens norms.” Id. at 27-28.
59.

American Soc’y Int’l Law., The U.S. and the International Criminal
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18, 2010), available at
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[https://perma.cc/KK4Z-AN3Z] (statement of Harold H. Koh at
1:04:17).
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See INT’L CRIM. CRT., supra note 19; see also S.C. RC/Res. 6, supra
note 29.
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within the language of the Rome Statute. These two constraining
hurdles were developed during the Kampala review conference, where
they were agreed upon as a matter of reaching a compromise solution
capable of being approved by consensus––within the limits, of course,
of what might reasonably be sustained as positions consistent with the
Statute. As the consensus achieved in Kampala demonstrates, the
establishment of such hurdles was accepted as being sufficiently
within the competence of the Review Conference so as not to disturb
the process of reaching an effective compromise agreement.
It is true, of course, that Article 121(5)––a mixed provision,
touching on entry into force as well as jurisdiction––does little to
advance the cause of clarity. There can be little argument that, read
literally and isolation, at first blush it would appear to entirely
exempt nationals of non-ratifying States Parties from the Court’s
exercise of aggression jurisdiction. Yet, as discussed above, there is
simply no way that such a construction can be squared with the
broader language of the Statute, nor with the delicate balance of
compromises that were arduously negotiated and ultimately agreed to
in Kampala.61
Given the substance of Under-Secretary Sewall’s speech, its title
“The ICC Crime of Aggression and the Changing International
Security Landscape,” offers food for thought. In concluding her
remarks, she candidly emphasized, “[t]o be sure, the activation of the
Court’s jurisdiction over aggression is not a step that the United
States has sought.”62 This would certainly seem to imply a preference
for a Court whose hands continue to be tied as to the crime of
aggression. Because of this, some may suspect that the U.S. is more
interested in maintaining the current international landscape than in
changing it.
It may well be said that the current state of global relations more
nearly represents an insecurity landscape, than one of security, whose
horizon happens to be dwarfed by U.S. prominence in many respects,
including as the world leader in global arms exports and military
spending.63 Because of this, some may question whether U.S. nonsupport of the Kampala amendments, like its non-membership in the
Court itself, may perhaps be based on perceived geopolitical, rather
than merely humanitarian, interest and objectives.
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See supra Part III.D.
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Sewall Speech, supra note 29.
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The United States Leads Upward Trend in Arms Exports, Asia and Gulf
States Arms Imports Up, Says, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST.
(Mar. 16, 2015), available at
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015
[https://perma.cc/LS8R-4DDW].

211

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
Current U.S. Policy on the Crime of Aggression

The remark that activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over
aggression is not a step that the United States has sought makes
rather short shrift of the broader track record of the United States
and its historic role in working to establish aggression as a
prosecutable international crime. Without the insistent leadership of the
United States, the waging of aggressive war––or, as it was characterized by the
IMT, war “in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances”––
would never have been made the cornerstone of the criminal indictments at
Nuremberg, nor unanimously affirmed as an international crime in December of
1946 by the U.N. General Assembly.64
There is no question that the American architects of the
Nuremberg Trials led the way in the last century in criminalizing
aggressive war-making. In doing so, they certainly took a historic step
forward. Perhaps with this in mind, Justice Jackson, in his opening
statement before the IMT, unapologetically observed, “[u]nless we are
prepared to abandon every principle of growth for international law,
we cannot deny that our own day has the right to institute customs
and to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a
newer and strengthened international law.”65
So, too, today, in proscribing not only wars of aggression, but also
serious acts of aggression, the Kampala amendments may similarly
represent a historic step forward. Whether current U.S. policy will
ultimately have the effect of contributing to the making of such
history, or, instead, to its unmaking, yet remains to be seen.
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